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Abstract
What happens when a policy with millions of beneficiaries is threatened? The Affordable
Care Act (ACA) has been under attack since before it was signed into law, culminating in its
only legislative challenge under the Trump administration in 2017. While we know that policies
like the ACA produce policy feedbacks that affect policymaking and shape policy attitudes, less
is known about behavioral feedback effects that serve to mobilize beneficiaries to protect and
maintain their health insurance benefits in the face of ACA threat. This dissertation leverages a
3-paper design to evaluate under what conditions threat facilitates behavioral change, and how to
identify beneficiaries for purposes of political mobilization. The first paper relies on survey data
to examine perceptions of threat among self-reported ACA beneficiaries and how this affects
political participation, while the third paper examines how threat produces behavioral change
using an original survey experiment comparing threat messaging to opportunity messaging
around a fictitious ACA amendment. While findings across these two studies are mixed, results
generally suggests that ACA threat leads individuals, particularly those who benefit from the
policy, to increase their political participation to protect against perceived policy threat. The
second paper evaluates challenges with surveys that rely on self-reported policy benefits, and
examines what factors affect misreporting of benefits – offering one solution to predict ACA
beneficiaries using known demographic predictors of ACA benefit. Together, the findings of the
three papers, while supportive of threat as a key motivator of protective political behaviors, draw
attention to the limitations of survey data and our reliance of self-reports in studies of policy
change and political behavior.
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The Politics of Repeal and Replace: Project Overview

Health care reform is a policy issue that has long dominated the American political
landscape – consistently emerging as a top policy priority among voters as an issue they want the
government to address (Jones 2020; Newport 2018). Despite the initial failure at reform in the
early 1990s, the Obama administration marked a turning point with the passage of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in March 2010. Though heavily opposed by
Republicans – and ultimately contributing to the formation of the Tea Party faction of the
Republican Party – the ACA is responsible for over 20 million Americans gaining insurance
through the Marketplace and via Medicaid expansion in certain states (Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities 2019). Insurance gains were largely concentrated among non-white citizens,
women, those within 100% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), and those living in Medicaid
expansion states (Garfield, Orgera, and Damico 2019). Despite tens of millions of ACA
beneficiaries, the policy has been under threat since before it was signed into law – with
Republican leaders vowing to repeal it on the eve of its signing ceremony (Hulse 2017).
What happens when a policy with millions of beneficiaries is threatened? We know that
policies produce institutional feedbacks that affect the processes through – and venues in – which
policymaking and policy change take place (Pierson 1993, 2005; Schattschneider 1960), but
what about behavioral feedbacks mobilizing beneficiaries to protect against benefit threat?
Previous work on senior citizens mobilizing to protect their social security benefits provides
some insight into this phenomenon, outlining how self-interest drives political mobilization in
the face of policy threat (Campbell 2003). However, this work draws on a policy that is much
less partisan compared to the ACA – leaving space to explore the ways in which self-interest
interacts with partisanship in the face of policy threat. Recent work highlights how public
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opinion in favor of the ACA increases among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, alike, as a
function of their benefit from – or pro-sociality towards – the policy itself (Jacobs and Mettler
2018). These attitudinal changes remain statistically significant even when controlling for
partisanship. However, a key question remains: under what conditions does threat facilitate
behavioral change?
This dissertation project employs a 3-paper design to address this question through a
series of interconnected studies which rely on survey data, multiple imputation, and an original
survey experiment to evaluate when and how threat affects political participation. Each of these
papers draws on the ACA and the threat of prospective benefit loss as a unifying frame through
which to evaluate behavioral feedback effects – highlighting under what conditions policy threat
serves as a mobilizing political force in the frame of sharpening polarization.
The first paper leverages survey data from the 2018 ANES Pilot Study and the 2018
Wesleyan Media Project to evaluate how perceptions of threat among self-described ACA
beneficiaries facilitates political participation, and to what degree that threat perception is shaped
by media exposure. Paper two is a direct compliment to the first paper, which evaluates the
usefulness of survey self-reports – such as those used to identify ACA beneficiaries in paper one
– and explores how social identity and social desirability bias intersect to predict benefit
(mis)reporting, especially with policies that are deeply partisan in nature such as the ACA. This
paper leverages a multi-method approach to identify who misreports benefits and predict which
of those individuals is likely to benefit based on demographic predictors. Finally, the third paper
is built around an original survey experiment that examines how policy messaging affects
political behavior. Motivated by the repeal and replace mantra that dominated the 2017 repeal
attempt of the ACA, the experiment compares threat and opportunity messaging around a
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fictional ACA amendment to uncover patterns in participation compared to neutral policy
messaging. This third paper is particularly notable given that experimental methods have until
now remained under-utilized in the study of behavioral policy feedback effects, and isolating
these causal mechanisms provides additional support of survey-based findings in paper one –
with a design that avoids some of the pitfalls associated with benefit misreporting as explored in
paper two.

3

Policy More Than Partisanship: Evaluating the Determinative Power of Policy Benefit in
Enhancing Political Participation Under Threat

Abstract
When people benefit from a policy, evaluations of that policy improve – in particular, the
literature highlights how favorability increases among beneficiaries regardless of partisan
identity. Less is known, however, about how policy benefit affects political participation –
specifically when those benefits are under threat. Building on existing work around the ACA and
the political behaviors of its beneficiaries, this study explicitly focuses on what happens when
policies are threatened. Leveraging the ACA as a case study, I explore how threat perception
leads to behavioral change to protect against benefit threat using data from the 2018 ANES Pilot
Study and the Wesleyan Media Project’s 2018 dataset. Results indicate mixed evidence related to
media exposure’s role in sharpening threat perception, however findings do generally indicate
that benefit threat leads to protective behaviors both in terms of voting and non-voting behaviors.
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1. The Cost of Repeal and Replace
The day before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into
law in 2010, Republican strategists developed their opposition strategy: “repeal and replace”
(Hulse 2017). Though operationalized as a savvy electoral tool by leading Republican operatives,
follow through with a reasonable plan to repeal and replace the landmark health care legislation
was much more limited – even after gaining unified control of the legislative and executive
branches following the 2016 election. Indeed, when it came time to repeal and replace just
months into the Trump administration, undermining or altering the ACA in any meaningful way
became politically untenable, with the public fearful of losing their access to health insurance
afforded to them by protections included in the ACA. Self-described ACA beneficiaries had
reason to be defensive of their benefits under threat: prior to the introduction of the ACA, the
national uninsured rate was 17.8% – more than a decade later, this rate has fallen to 10.9%
(Hrynowski 2020; Newport 2018; Tolbert and Orgera 2020).
How did this threat of prospective benefit loss spur action on the part of ACA
beneficiaries to protect themselves against loss? Where is the tipping point from the maintenance
of a consistent partisan identity to mobilizing to protect one’s own benefits – and how do people
even know their benefits are threatened in the first place? This paper investigates what happens
when a policy is threatened. Specifically, I examine how beneficiaries of that policy learn about
the threat and the conditions under which the threat shapes their action. I leverage the ACA as a
case study to evaluate behavioral change among self-identified beneficiaries, tracing how threat
perception is refined by media exposure, and how that threat perception leads beneficiaries to
change their political behaviors to protect against threat. I use data from the American National
Election Study’s (ANES) 2018 Pilot Survey combined with data from the Wesleyan Media
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Project’s (WMP) 2018 data release to evaluate these phenomena. I find that media exposure has
limited impact on threat perception, but that those self-identifying beneficiaries with the most
heightened sense of threat engage in politics more than those with a lower sense of threat.
Additionally, in terms of voting, people who believe their benefits are under threat are more
likely to vote against their partisan identities compared to their counterparts who feel less
threatened. These findings have implications for the literature on when self-interest can
overcome partisanship among at-risk populations and the electoral implications associated with
these behavioral changes.

2. Beneficiaries and Their Partisan Networks
Existing studies of behavioral policy feedbacks highlight the determinative role of self
interest in driving behavioral changes among the mass public when faced with prospective threat.
These feedbacks mobilize and facilitate participatory changes among beneficiaries, making clear
the linkage between personal connection to policies, and the administration and active protection
of benefits against threat of compromise or outright repeal (Campbell 2003; Erikson and Stoker
2011; Jacobs and Mettler 2018; Mettler and Mettler 2005, 2005). Recent study of the ACA’s
feedback effects among target populations demonstrates how those with the most to gain – much
like senior citizens benefiting from Social Security – become more supportive of the policy,
while those who do not benefit become less supportive (Hobbs and Hopkins 2020). Other
evidence highlights how personal benefit threat and partisanship are similarly determinative in
motivating Americans to purchase health insurance under the ACA (Reny and Sears 2020) –
further evidence that, at least in terms of health behaviors – beneficiary status holds its own as a
faciliatory means through which people choose to engage with the ACA, irrespective of
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partisanship. The narrative of threat response among beneficiaries, particularly in terms of
changes in political behavior to protect against prospective loss of benefits, is less complete.

2.1

Perception is Reality
What does it mean to benefit from a policy? Some populations are more sensitive to

policy changes and choose to opt into or out of politics as a result (Michener 2018, 2019).
However, most people understand very little about politics (Campbell et al. 1980; Converse
2006a; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017), and it stands to reason that very few people fully understand
which policies they may benefit from and in what capacity. Thus, the important thing to consider
here is something more universal than political knowledge and, indeed, not dependent on it:
personal belief. Beliefs, though not always rooted in fact, are a powerful psychological tool
(Bartels 2002; Rutjens and Brandt 2018). An individual’s beliefs about and perceptions of a
given policy or political event shape their reality. Whether right or wrong, this idea of believing
that you benefit from, or were harmed by, a policy is what shapes behaviors – regardless of what
the reality of the situation might be.
From this, the concept of a believed beneficiary begins to take shape. If you believe you
benefit from a policy, you will behave like you benefited from that policy. If you believe that
you were harmed by a policy, you will behave in ways that reflect that. All this regardless of
one’s actual status as a beneficiary.

2.2

Partisan, but to what extent?
At what point does individualism supersede beneficiaries’ innate desire for shared group

identity in instances of benefit threat? Self-interest can moderate habitual partisan behaviors;
however this can come at a cost that limits participatory changes among in-group partisans who
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are fundamentally at odds with the social and political identity of the in-group network.
Homogenous in-group networks rely on strong interpersonal bonds facilitating strong partisan
attachments (Parsons 2015). Once these bonds are formed, group members resist the breakdown
of these attachments even when it may be expedient to do so (Baumeister and Leary 1995). This
is a key characteristic of group identity relevant specifically to the evolutionary perspective of
identity formation – in which there is a common fate shared by a collective of similar people
who remain tied to one another to survive against threats, reliant on shared norms and symbolism
to further entrench their shared identity characteristics and values (Huddy 2003).
Despite the general lack of political knowledge endemic to American democracy, people
still vote in elections, form preferences, take cues from political elites to engage in policy
debates and make sense of the political world (Zaller 1992). Typically, when we think about
parties, we discuss them as an organizing tool (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993) and as
a means of forming and maintaining a shared group identity that facilitates political mobilization
(Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004). So often, the decisions we make – and the beliefs we
hold – are a reflection of this identity: who we vote for (Campbell et al. 1980), who we socialize
with (Mutz 2006), who we prefer our children to marry (S. Klar, Krupnikov, and Ryan 2018).
Political identity is paramount – not only as an informational tool, but as a psychological
mechanism that facilitates social connections and belongingness within groups. It is within
parties that the social capital necessary to fully participate in political life is built and exercised
among likeminded co-partisans (Huddy 2003).
While a useful tool for the development of social capital facilitating political engagement,
this framework poses several problems for group members whose own views or interests directly
contradict the shared social and political bond of their partisan network. First, they may avoid

8

politically motivated discussion with people that they know to not share their views in an effort
to maintain network cohesion and avoid in-group conflict (Ulbig and Funk 1999). Second, this
can lead people to withdraw from their same-party social networks (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and
Sprague 2004) – resulting in increased ambivalence and decreased political engagement and
participation (Parsons 2010).
Political parties serve as a key type of network which organize belief structures and
motivate members via increased social capital and the facilitation of political learning and
mobilization within the political process (Putnam 2001). The resources afforded by a party – in
terms of voter resources, issue framing, and mobilization around election time (Gelman and King
1993; Johnston 1992; Shaw 1999) – are minimized in such instances where a campaign cues
issues that a voter fundamentally disagrees with their own party on. While engaging contrasting
beliefs can improve deliberative democracy, being confronted with ideas – or, in the context of
this study, personal experiences – that contradict in-group thinking, this exposure has a
depressive effect on participation (Mutz 2006). Given that different expressions of political
engagement and participation are more and less visible and/or network-dependent than others,
variation in these depressive effects is possible as a function of how visible the political activity
an individual undertakes is.

3. How Policy Learning is Facilitated by the Media
Referred to as the “Fourth Estate” of power, the media frames discourse and cues
important issues to a generally unpolitical populace (Iyengar and Kinder 2010; Prior 2007). In
the case of policy benefits, media exposure sharpens understandings of where parties stand on a
policy issue and increases awareness of the full extent of citizens’ own perceived benefit from
the policy (Helbling and Tresch 2011). Do I benefit from this policy? Are my benefits at risk? Is
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my party protecting my benefits? What is in my own best interest? These are all questions that
media exposure helps people answer, amplifying relevant informational sources to supplement
the identity sources that stem from parties and the group identities that they construct and
maintain.
Given exposure to media that indicates benefits under threat, loss aversion motivates
citizens to seek out alternative information in a manner that they would not otherwise. This
response is cued as a function of threat perception. Media exposure, political knowledge, and
personal experience interact in the capacity that individuals must have exposure to political
media in addition to the capacity to understand it – complimented by their own experiences to
supplement media learning (Ridout, Grosse, and Appleton 2008). If people are politically
knowledgeable, then media exposure linked to threat helps to refine their sense of threat (Ridout,
Grosse, and Appleton 2008). Meanwhile, if the individual is less politically knowledgeable, they
leverage personal experience to supplement those parts of the political world that they are less
conscious/understanding of (Ridout, Grosse, and Appleton 2008).
Geographic variation in media exposure drives differences in behaviors and policy
perceptions (Gollust et al. 2014, 2018), with individuals that are exposed to more media
coverage reporting feeling more informed about legislation and its impacts (Fowler et al. 2017).
Tone of coverage also incites different emotional reactions and variation in preference formation,
especially in instances of threat – wherein citizens adopt policy preferences perceived to combat
threat when exposed to emotionally powerful media coverage linked to that threat (Gadarian
2010). In the frame of this project, such evidence underscores how exposure to different types of
political information facilitates differences in policy perceptions and learning linked to benefit
threat and adoption of behaviors to protect against that threat.
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4. Applying Prospect Theory to Policy Benefits
Behavioral economics provides a lens through which we can understand the role of
benefit threat and threat response: prospect theory. This theory outlines how losses are much
more powerful psychological mechanisms compared to prospective gains (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979). Humans are naturally loss averse, and threat of loss facilitates learning that can
lead to behavioral changes to protect against that loss. At its most basic level, loss aversion can
motivate shifts in the political environment (Alesina and Passarelli 2015). Of course, these shifts
must be large enough to overcome “status quo bias” (Alesina and Passarelli 2015). Recent
evidence demonstrates that those individuals with the most to lose are more likely to take risks
they perceive as helping them to avoid imminent threat of loss (Osmundsen and Petersen 2019).
Within the policy space, prospect theory has most often been applied to foreign policy rather
than American domestic policy (Vis and Kuijpers 2018). However, theory-building has taken
place at the domestic level in relation to American political behavior and the role of loss aversion
rooted in prospect theory – specifically, the tracing of economic conditions to predict voter
behavior and electoral outcomes (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Erikson 1990; Levy 2003).
Taken together, prospective loss competes with partisanship to affect political behavior
when the media leads individuals to believe that they are beneficiaries and that their benefits are
under threat. This is a function of citizens’ propensity to protect themselves against threat. When
a threat punctuates the relative equilibrium of the policy space, concern about one’s own benefits
is cued against the backdrop of that policy space. If threat of loss drives behavioral change that
overcomes partisanship, the effect of that threat should be evident among those whose own
interests put them at odds with intra-party belief structures around their perceived benefits.
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5. The Tipping Point: Self Interest Over Partisanship
In the frame of existing studies of partisanship, political participation, and self-interest, I
build a theoretical framework that traces threat recognition and response among policy
beneficiaries. Believed policy benefit facilitates a new frame through which we process media
exposure, because our self-interest motivates protective behaviors – ones that can challenge our
partisan networks and their typical behaviors. Benefit perception is sharpened by the media,
which facilitates political learning and alerts us to threats to benefits. Without the media, our
understanding of benefit threat is severely limited – if we do not know that there is a threat
before the worst-case scenario, benefit loss will precede our realization of benefits in the first
place.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Increased media attention to the ACA will increase sense of threat
among beneficiaries.
This threat, sharpened by media exposure, mediates participation changes among those
who believe their benefits are under threat. According to prospect theory, this should motivate
people to participate politically in a manner that protects against prospective threats to perceived
benefits. In the frame of benefit loss, political behaviors will be undertaken in a manner that
helps to manage benefit loss – leading to increased participation and influencing vote choice for
candidates that aim to protect their benefits.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Individuals who identify as ACA beneficiaries, compared to those
who don’t, will participate more in political activities.
In the frame of conspicuous versus inconspicuous participation, prospect theory’s
conceptualization of ‘risky behavior’ can be applied to the political realm in the capacity that
partisans whose self-interests are not reflected or validated in the collective interests of their
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parties may participate differently than their co-partisans. The visibility of these participatory
changes, however, may be subdued – voting for the other party is a personal and largely private
behavior, whereas canvassing for a member of the opposing party out of self-interest puts
beneficiaries in a socially vulnerable position as a function of how public that behavior is,
relative to voting. Thus, I expect that behavioral change will be moderated on the basis of
visibility among perceived beneficiaries when their self-interest is at odds with their own party’s
political position. Visibility is most relevant when considering voter registration and vote choice
– which are personal and less visible – as compared to attending rallies or posting political
materials publicly. For example, a Republican beneficiary might support a Democratic candidate
at the ballot box, but still refuse to post campaign materials that signal that vote choice for fear of
being ostracized by their partisan network.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Compared to Democrats, Republican ACA beneficiaries will be less
likely to register and vote.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Republican ACA beneficiaries are more likely than Republican nonbeneficiaries to vote for Democratic candidates.
Together, this theoretical framework traces threat recognition and response among policy
beneficiaries, accounting for the various conditions under which threat facilitates participatory
change.

6. Data and Methods
I merge variables from the American National Election Study’s (ANES) 2018 Pilot Study
(n=2,000) with variables from the Wesleyan Media Project’s (WMP) 2018 Dataset (n=>1M).
The key WMP variable is a generated variable that averages the volume of campaign media
about the 2017 ACA repeal attempt, by state. Upon merging the WMP and the ANES data, a
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media index is generated, which combines average ACA media by state and individual-level
political awareness. I also generate an insurance concern index as a proxy for threat, combining
two variables that measure (i) concern about insurance loss, and (ii) concern about not being able
to afford insurance. These two index variables are instrumental to my analysis, allowing for the
evaluation of the mediating power of media linked to the topic of ACA repeal, and its effect on
perceptions of insurance concern.
I employ a multi-step methodological approach to trace the narrative developed in my
theoretical framework. First, I measure the effect of political media in sharpening beneficiaries’
sense of insurance threat. Using an ordered probit regression, I model the effect of the media
index on the concern index among those who report having benefited from the ACA. I include
covariates for partisan strength, income, education, race, and gender, and repeat this regression
for the entire beneficiary population, as well as for the beneficiary populations within each
partisan group: Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. Isolating my analysis to only selfreported beneficiaries allows me to establish the role of the media in facilitating threat perception
among the beneficiary population, providing a hard test for how threat perception is heightened
in instances of prospective loss.
Second, I trace the effect of benefit threat on non-electoral behaviors. Using individual
probit models for attending a political meeting, attending a protest, displaying campaign
materials, and contributing to non-campaign political organizations, I measure the likelihood for
each among self-identifying beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
Finally, I trace the effect of benefit threat on voter registration, vote choice, and turnout.
Using individual probit models for voter registration, Democratic house candidate preference,
and turnout, I measure the likelihood for each among self-identifying beneficiaries and non-
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beneficiaries. Focusing specifically on Democratic house candidate preference, given that 2018
is a midterm election year, this tests my hypothesis that beneficiaries will engage in counterpartisan voting behaviors in instances where their own party’s interests are at odds with their
self-interest. Voter registration and voter turnout metrics sharpen this analysis, providing
evidence of intent to vote on those candidate preferences. Together, this 3-step approach tests the
hypotheses set forth within this study sequentially, inclusive of standard demographic and
partisan covariates to evaluate the effect of individual-level characteristics on each models’
respective dependent variables.

7. Results
7.1

Establishing the Role of the Media
Modeling the effect of political media exposure – including that which is specifically

related to the 2017 ACA repeal attempt – on insurance concern among beneficiaries, uneven
patterns of media influence emerge. When all beneficiaries are included in the model (see Figure
1)1, media exposure is not predictive of increased perceptions about insurance concern. There are
a few exceptions to this rule, but the pattern is very clear: considering all beneficiaries together,
media exposure wields no meaningful effect among self-identifying beneficiaries of the ACA.
This pattern is less clear, however, among partisan beneficiaries when they are modeled
independently from other parties. For instance, self-identifying Democrat beneficiaries generally
do not experience any increase in perceptions of insurance concern. Some Democrat
beneficiaries experienced a decrease in such concern at some of the highest levels of political
media exposure, however these are also citizens who – by virtue of their intense engagement in

1

Covariates for strength of partisanship, income, education, race, and gender are similarly included in all ordered
probit models, though not displayed alongside media effects in Figure 1.
15

politics – are already conscious of their insurance status and threats to such benefits, thus making
it appear as though they are unphased by the threat of benefit loss. More research on this inverted
effect is necessary and should be pursued to explore how Democrats – as the party of the ACA –
may experience different behavioral feedback effects relative to other partisan beneficiary
groups.
Self-identifying Republican and Independent beneficiaries experience similar, although
inconsistent, patterns in the relationship between political media exposure and insurance
concern. Unlike their Democratic counterparts, there is no level of media exposure at which
either Republicans or Independents become less insurance insecure. Among Republicans,
insurance concern is strongly associated with media exposure of all levels, though is most
consistent among the highest exposure and lower exposure levels. This is similar among
independents, but less consistent in terms of trends by exposure level. One explanation for these
broader trends punctuated by relative instability is the fact that fewer Republicans and
Independents self-identify as ACA beneficiaries compared to Democrats. Whether this is a
function of being healthier than Democrats, or a critical misunderstanding of one’s government
benefits and status as an ACA beneficiary remains unclear. Nevertheless, these patterns warrant
further investigation to uncover whether – if respondents were actually representative of the
ACA beneficiary breakdown at the national level – Republicans and Independents truly do
observe increased perceptions of insurance concern while Democrats do not.

Figure 1. Effect of Political Media on Insurance Concern Among Beneficiary Populations
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Within the larger frame of this study, this provides mixed evidence in support of H1 –
media coverage does not universally increase feelings of insurance concern across partisan
groups. The strongest, positive media effects are observed among self-identifying Republican
beneficiaries of the ACA, though these effects are unequally observed across the political media
exposure index. This could be due to differences in the nature of the media coverage rather than
media exposure by itself, and further study should be pursued in this vein to investigate further.
A possible explanation for this phenomenon could be that Democrats might not rely as heavily
on media cues as compared to Republicans or Independents because their party exerts issue
ownership over the ACA – thus, they are already keenly aware of their threat perception given
exposure to intra-partisan cues about the ACA and their benefits. Conversely, Republicans and
Independents are not exposed to intra-party cues about ACA threat in the same manner –
meaning that the media could have a stronger effect in cueing that threat than their own parties,
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standing in for that party network when beneficiaries’ interests are at odds with the interests of
their party.

7.2

Testing the Effect of ACA Benefit on Non-Voting Measures of Political Participation
Modeling the effect of ACA benefit on non-voting participation metrics (See Figure 2)2,

inconsistent patterns of benefit effects emerge both within and across parties. Self-identifying
Democratic beneficiaries (those who claimed that the ACA made it easier for them to get health
insurance) do not display any participatory differences from those who reported the ACA as
having no effect on their ability to secure health insurance. One exception is in terms of
displaying campaign materials, where non-beneficiary Democrats are less likely to display
campaign materials than co-partisan beneficiaries. Self-identifying Independent beneficiaries are
largely indistinguishable from their non-beneficiary co-partisans in terms of political
participation, with null effects on most measures. Exceptions include posting online, where
Independents – regardless of beneficiary status – are less likely to engage in politics online.
Additionally, non-beneficiary Independents are less likely to attend political meetings and
protests – with their co-partisan beneficiaries observing null effects on those same measures.

Figure 2. Effect of ACA Benefit on Non-Voting Participation Metrics, by Party

2

Covariates for political media exposure, strength of partisanship, income, education, race, and gender are similarly
included in all probit models plotted here, though not displayed alongside the effect of ACA benefit in Figure 2.
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Evidence from Figure 2 suggests that Republican beneficiaries generally observe larger
participatory changes than those who do not experience the same increase in threat perception.
Self-identifying Republican beneficiaries are more likely to attend a political meeting, attend a
protest, display campaign materials, and contribute to non-campaign political organizations –
evidence of a moderate, positive relationship. This demonstrates that, at least among selfidentifying Republican beneficiaries, their beneficiary status in the aftermath of the 2017 ACA
repeal attempt had a significant, positive effect on most measures of non-voting political
participation. This provides support for H2 but suggests that H3 may overstate the determinative
effect of partisanship on Republican beneficiary behavior. Beneficiaries, at odds with their
party’s position against the ACA, do tend to participate more. A similar depressive effect is not
observed as expected among Republicans for participation measures that are more visible or
more network dependent – instead, null effects are observed for posting online and contributing
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to a campaign. Indeed, the only depressive effect among Republicans is observed among nonbeneficiaries who are less likely to attend political meetings than beneficiary co-partisans.
Taken together, benefit threat has a positive effect on political participation among selfidentifying beneficiaries – specifically among those whose self-interest is at odds with their
party. This extends to most measures of participation regardless of visibility, indicative that
policy benefit is a statistically significant predictor of political participation even when
controlling for typical predictors of political participation including partisanship strength, media
attention, education, race, and gender.

7.3

Testing the Effect of ACA Benefit on Non-Voting Measures of Political Participation

Figure 3. Effect of ACA Benefit on Voter Behaviors, by Party

20

Republican beneficiaries are more likely to participate politically, providing evidence in
support of the larger theory this study explores. However, it remains less clear whether
participation changes are in support of the opposing party – for Republicans, this equates to
voting for Democratic candidates. Evidence of Republican beneficiaries voting for Democratic
candidates will bolster the argument that these participatory changes are being undertaken to
protect against benefit loss – with Republicans behaving in counter-partisan (risky) behaviors, as
expected under the prospect theory framework.
As outlined in Figure 33, ACA beneficiaries express preference to vote for a Democratic
House candidate when compared to co-partisans who do not identify as benefitting from the
ACA with the notable exception of Democrats. These findings are striking evidence that threat
does translate not only to non-voting participatory increases, but also to voting behaviors to
protect against threat of future benefit loss among Republicans specifically. Beneficiaries are
also no less likely to register to vote or turnout than their non-beneficiary co-partisans – with the
noted exception of Independents – indicating that voting preferences, even when they run
counter to one’s own party’s interests, are acted upon. The lack of evidence here to suggest
depressive effects on political behavior as a result of benefit loss is compelling evidence in
support of the existence of a self-interested tipping point among beneficiaries at odds with their
parties: at the end of the day, they will choose to look out for themselves – not their co-partisans.
In the frame of prospect theory and engaging in risky behavior to protect against prospective
loss, evidence supports my third hypothesis: that partisans at odds with their parties will engage
in “risky” behavior – in this case, out-partisan vote choice – to protect against the threat, even at
the electoral expense of their own party.

3

Covariates for political media exposure, strength of partisanship, income, education, race, and gender are similarly
included in all probit models plotted here, though not displayed alongside the effect of ACA benefit in Figure 3.
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8. Discussion
Policy benefit undoubtedly affects political behavior insofar as benefiting from the ACA
leads to increased political participation – even among Republican partisans, who we might
expect to care less about ACA benefit as a function of their partisan identities. These results
provide some evidence to suggest that there is indeed a tipping point beyond which policy
benefit determines political behavior above and beyond the effect of partisanship. Notably,
beneficiaries engage in risky (ie. counter-partisan) behaviors when their benefits are threatened –
contributing to the existing literature on behavioral policy feedbacks and extending existing
literature which has until now focused primarily on attitudinal changes at the expense of
participation changes.
While the role of the media warrants further study to understand patterns of media
exposure, coverage type, and the impacts of these on threat perception, the results of this study
nevertheless provide support for the argument that policy threat leads beneficiaries to participate
more politically. Beyond the scholarly implications of this study, such findings provide useful
direction to policymakers: electoral and non-electoral outcomes, alike, are affected by threat
among beneficiary populations. Future scholarship should continue to test this finding in the
frame of other social policies to explore its portability to non-ACA policy threat.
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Social Identity, Impression Management, and Benefit Under-Reporting: Applying Multiple
Imputation to Combat Social Desirability Bias

Abstract
Concerns with self-reports are a critical issue widely addressed within survey methods
research. However, these studies frequently focus on risky behaviors like drug use and other
sensitive topics. Rarely, if ever, is the topic of misreporting linked to policy benefit. When do
people report – and, more specifically, choose not to report – benefiting from a policy? I use the
ACA as a case study to examine the intersecting themes of social identity and social desirability
bias to evaluate predictors of benefit reporting. Applying a multiple imputation approach to an
existing dataset, this study not only predicts likelihood of social desirability bias as a function of
partisan identity, but also predicts likely benefit from the ACA based on demographic indicators
among those most susceptible to that bias in their self-reports. Findings suggest that Republican
partisans are most affected by social desirability bias, and that this bias increases their likelihood
of reporting no benefit from the ACA. When imputing existing data to predict Republican
benefit based on demographic indicators rather than self-reports, significantly more beneficiaries
are identified as compared to self-reports, with predicted estimates more closely reflecting
national estimates of benefit.
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1. Challenging Evidence from Self-Reported Beneficiary Data
Self-identified beneficiaries of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) generally participate more
in politics when faced with the threat of prospective benefit loss (Dreher 2021). This is true even
among Republicans, whose benefit from the ACA increases the likelihood that they engage in
vote-switching in support of Democratic candidates (Dreher 2021). Reliance on self-reports,
however, ignores the potential of systematic misreporting of benefit status. For example, the
2018 ANES Pilot Study data used in that previous study shows that, despite national estimates of
similar rates of ACA benefit across partisan groups, Republican respondents report being far less
likely to benefit from the ACA relative to their Democratic counterparts.
This puzzle motivates the key methodological question underpinning my second study of
behavioral policy feedbacks linked to the ACA: When do people report – or choose not to report
– policy benefit? Several explanations exist for why this is, including differences stemming from
political socialization and knowledge, and partisan social desirability bias. This study focuses
specifically on social desirability bias among Republican ACA beneficiaries, and examines these
phenomena in sequence, exploring (i) what factors predict partisans’ self-reported benefit from
the ACA, (ii) how these factors map onto what we know of beneficiary demographics at the
national level, and (iii) the viability of predictive interventions to identify likely beneficiaries
who do not self-report ACA benefit using known beneficiary demographic mapping. I employ
predictive analysis to address these motivating themes, finding that self-censoring is associated
with a lower likelihood of reporting ACA benefit – a phenomenon which largely exists only
among Republican voters. When applying a predictive imputation approach to the data,
Republican beneficiary estimates more closely resemble their Democratic counterparts. Not only
do these findings add to the growing discussion surrounding the validity of self-reports and
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conclusions drawn from such data, the newly imputed data identifies one solution for balancing
out the effect of social desirability bias in an effort to produce more accurate model estimates in
instances of bias in self-reported data.

2. Who Benefits from the ACA?
ACA beneficiaries are identifiable by many shared demographic characteristics. In terms
of income, those who fall below 100% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) see a decrease in their
uninsured rate of nearly 10% with the implementation of the ACA; while those who fall within
100% and 199%, and over 200%, see decreases of approximately 11% and 5%, respectively
(Garfield, Orgera, and Damico 2019a). These decreases in uninsured rates manifest differently
among Hispanic Americans (-11%), Asian Americans (-9%), Black Americans (-8%), and White
Americans (-5%) – all with varied effect (Garfield, Orgera, and Damico 2019a). The ACA
makes it easier for women in particular to afford insurance, with substantial gains in their
insurance rates between 2010, when the ACA was introduced, and 2016 (Gunja et al. 2017).
The largest decreases in uninsured rates are attributable to Medicaid expansions under the
Affordable Care Act, with states that choose to expand Medicaid seeing an over 7% drop in
uninsured rates compared to states that do not expand Medicaid (Garfield, Orgera, and Damico
2019a). Along partisan lines, evidence suggests that Democrats benefit from larger gains in
insurance than Republicans in terms of private marketplace plans, however there remains no
difference among partisans on the basis of insurance gains through Medicaid expansions
specifically (Sances and Clinton 2019). Thus, among those adults living in states that expand
Medicaid, there should be minimal to no partisan differences among Democrats and Republicans
in terms of insurance gains afforded by the ACA. Notably, Republicans more likely to self-report
excellent health (self-reported health status, or SR.HS) compared to Democrats (Pacheco and
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Fletcher 2015). These differences, however, are reflected in national-level beneficiary statistics
which account for variation in health status as a function of social determinants of health. This is
broadly indicative of the relationship between health inequalities and partisan identification and
underscores that, among self-identifying Republican voters, there are likely to be less ACA
beneficiaries relative to Democratic voters. Metrics of SR.HS are also vulnerable to social
desirability bias, and thus other demographic indicators are likely a more reliable estimation tool
for identifying beneficiaries.
How does this compare to who self-reports benefit from the ACA? Given that Republican
partisans are more likely to engage in self-censoring behaviors, and that self-censoring affects
self-reported ACA benefit, a larger narrative emerges that Republican partisans – as a function of
social desirability bias – will report benefiting from the ACA less than Democrats with the same
social identity characteristics. This is summarized in Table 1, where I categorize the percentage
of partisans that claim to benefit from the ACA by known demographic indicators of benefit
within the 2018 ANES Pilot Study data.
Table 1. Differences in Partisan Self-Reports of ACA Benefit
Democrats
40%
40%

Republicans
9%
7%

Difference
-127%
-140%

Men
Women

44%
37%

6%
10%

-152%
-115%

Non-Hispanic white
Hispanic
Black
Other

39%
39%
44%
46%

7%
17%
38%
5%

-139%
-79%
-15%
-161%

Medicaid Expansion State
Non-Medicaid Expansion
State

44%
32%

9%
6%

-132%
-137%

Less than college degree
College degree or more
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Most notable to this study are the major differences in self-reported benefit by party
within expansion states (see Table 1). We know that Medicaid Expansion status is an equal
predictor of ACA benefit among Democrats and Republicans, alike (Sances and Clinton 2019).
Thus, the significant difference in self-reporting in the ANES data indicates that something is
potentially amiss among Republicans, in particular. I center Republicans as a focus in this study
because Medicaid Expansion has been found to increase insurance gains by approximately 9.7
percentage points – which is reflected among Democrats in Table 1, but not among Republicans
who observed a 40% smaller difference than is reported nationally at just 3 percentage points
(Park et al. 2019). This provides evidence that there is a potential issue with self-reported data,
underscoring the motivation for this study: to uncover why systematic underreporting exists in
these data.

3. Factors That Affect Accurate Self-Reporting
3.1

Political Knowledge
Lack of political knowledge provides an overarching explanation for why some

individuals misreport policy benefit. We know that most people are not traditionally
knowledgeable or consistent insofar as they can make sense of the political world, relying on
cues and shortcuts from various sources to interpret their place in politics (Converse 2006b;
Kinder and Kalmoe 2017; Lupia 1994). Campaigns strengthen pre-existing views (Lazarsfeld,
Berelson, and Gaudet 1968), increasing cue salience and making salient certain frames
depending on the partisan audience (Gelman and King 1993; Johnston 1992; Shaw 1999). Thus,
if you do not know what policies do beyond what is cued by self-confirming sources, you might
not know that you benefit from any policy at all (Bartels 2002). This can lead to inaccurate selfreports, where respondents do not possess the political awareness necessary to correctly interpret
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survey questions (Achen 1975). For example, if a question is worded in a way that is convoluted
or confusing or cues an underlying bias, the response that question garners might not be accurate
– intentionally or not. Moreover, if a respondent does understand the question and know how to
answer it correctly, they might still opt out of answering a question or willfully misreport as a
function of pre-existing biases (Berinsky 1999; S. M. Klar, Weber, and Krupnikov 2016a).

3.2

Partisan Social Desirability Bias
In the ANES 2018 Pilot Study data, approximately 40% of Democrats report that the

ACA made it easier for them to gain health insurance, while just 8% of Republicans and 19% of
Independents report the same level of benefit. What explains this disparity? Existing literature
provides several explanations that help us understand why inaccurate self-reporting occurs. Most
notably: social desirability bias. Studying behavioral feedbacks is made more difficult given the
risk of social desirability bias in surveys related to policies that are inherently partisan, like the
ACA. In particular, social desirability bias linked to voters’ partisanship and self-monitoring –
that is, being conscious of norms linked to their partisanship and expressing themselves in ways
that remain consistent with expected norms within these environments – can be a concern in
surveys that rely on self-reports (S. M. Klar, Weber, and Krupnikov 2016b; Shepherd n.d.). In
the context of the ACA, social desirability bias could lead Republican voters who did, in fact,
gain insurance or otherwise benefit because of the ACA to claim that the ACA did not make it
easier for them to gain insurance as a function of their partisanship – thus appearing in survey
data as though they do not benefit from the ACA when indeed they do.
Though many factors can compound social desirability bias, religiosity is one that is
unique to Republican partisans specifically. Social desirability bias and the ultra-religious right
are two, interwoven phenomena (Shepherd n.d.). Religious and political extremism are closely

28

linked (Mez 2020), strengthening the confounding effect of partisanship among the most
religious evangelicals in particular. This is most likely to be observed among the Republican
religious right due to asymmetric polarization (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016). Those with
politically extreme views are more likely to engage in impression management, closely linked to
social desirability bias, to present a more socially acceptable persona to others (Moss and
O’Connor 2020) – which can additionally spur inaccurate reporting behaviors. Related evidence
does show this to be true in practice, with Republican partisans more susceptible to social
desirability bias than Democrats (Shin 2020).
Given the deeply partisan nature of the ACA, social desirability – regardless of its source
– is of particular concern. Even as Republicans defect in support of Democratic protectors of
their ACA benefits (Dreher 2021), they may still register as Republicans and vote Republican in
other types of races – thus increasing the likelihood that they might inaccurately respond to this
question in order to present a version of themselves to the public that is most consistent with
what is expected of a Republican. For example, one who votes Republican, and views
Democrats/Democratic policies as bad – even if they benefit from those very policies.

3.3

Credit and Blame
When considering the ACA, campaigns – like the ones that dominated the 2018 Midterm

elections - provide an opportunity to emphasize policy problems and assign blame/take credit
that cue those who are less politically aware to who owns what side of a policy issue (Petrocik
1996). Understanding one’s own benefit is further complicated by the existence of Medicaid
expansion versus non-expansion states – when a Republican state expands health coverage, who
receives credit? Is it the Republican governor? The Democrats who pass the legislation federally
that paved the way for that Republican governor? Credit-taking, partisanship, and a baseline lack
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of political knowledge interact to produce unfavorable conditions insofar as a voter knows what
policy they benefit from, and who facilitated that benefit – if one is to exist at all in the minds of
voters.
How do voters learn about who is to credit or blame for policy changes? As policy
discourse becomes more nationalized, even in instances where voters are very knowledgeable, it
has become difficult to draw correct distinctions between national, state-level, and local
policymaking and responsibilities. This matters in terms of blame and in terms of credit. One
example of this emerges in the case of rural hospital closures, wherein voters misplace blame on
Democrats – even when Republican Governors are to blame – backing candidates like Donald
Trump (Shepherd n.d.). Indeed, closure of rural hospitals signaled to voters that the economy
was not doing well – leading to the election of candidates they believed to do better on matters of
the economy. In terms of credit-taking, it is difficult for voters to assign credit for policy
successes when they are not fully aware of the scope of their own benefit from a given policy.
Similar to Shepherd’s conclusions related to economic performance and voter behavior, other
evidence suggests that the intentional diminishing of policies’ visibility to the public leads to
instances in which beneficiaries do not know that they are beneficiaries (Mettler 2011). Thus,
traditional measures of political knowledge exist as imperfect proxies for the full scope of
understanding the complexity of policymaking, benefit distribution, and personal benefit.

4. How to Account for Inaccurate Self-Reports of Policy Benefit
4.1

Account for Survey Error
Many well-studied strategies exist for the purposes of correcting errors in survey

responses – specifically in the capacity that they identify respondents with an increased
likelihood of misreporting or inaccurately responding to survey questions. One such strategy is
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the inclusion of knowledge questions that require specific answers that many people are unable
to recall without seeking out the answer (Clifford and Jerit 2016). These specific knowledge
questions have the dual benefit of identifying respondents concerned with impression
management and self-deceptive enhancement – two key features of social desirability bias
among survey respondents (Booth-Kewley, Larson, and Miyoshi 2007; Clifford and Jerit 2016;
Paulhus 1984, 1991). Other more direct strategies leverage direct question wording to combat
social desirability bias. For example, vote reporting accuracy is improved by including question
wording that indicates self-reports will be compared to public records to confirm truthfulness –
lessening the effect of social desirability bias (Hanmer, Banks, and White 2014). Other direct
strategies involve continued assurances of answer anonymity to increase honest self-reporting
(Murdoch et al. 2014). Self- and computer-assisted interviewing is also a strategy leveraged to
eliminate fears around judgement of answers by interviewers, leading to more honest selfreporting (Tourangeau and Smith 1996).
Indirect measures of social desirability similarly exist and can be used to correct for
potential bias. For instance, some surveys include questions about individual appearance –
serving as a proxy for social desirability bias as a function of respondents’ motivation to present
a certain way (Krumpal 2013). Social desirability bias is of particular concern for surveys that
rely on self-reported answers to sensitive questions – largely as a function of the respondents’
embarrassment or fear of repercussions for their actions, like illicit drug use (Tourangeau and
Yan 2007). Some studies on empathetic responses have found that performative empathy can be
an indicator of increased propensity for impression management (Sassenrath 2020), while others
indicate that performing political correctness is a function of impression management –
specifically among those with politically extreme views (Moss and O’Connor 2020). Beyond
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specific measures for managing social desirability bias, question formatting and delivery can also
help to mitigate under-reporting. In particular, evidence suggests that the crosswise model –
wherein sensitive questions/behaviors are posed alongside neutral questions/behaviors – is
effective in eliciting more honest responses (Jann, Jerke, and Krumpal 2012; Sagoe et al. 2021).
When using a crosswise model, respondents are asked if either of these types of behaviors is one
that they have engaged in – eliminating the embarrassment and discomfort associated with
answering affirmatively to the behavior or action most likely to be viewed as sensitive (Sagoe et
al. 2021). Taken together, controlling for bias is possible using questions that map social
characteristics which increase a respondents’ likelihood of self-monitoring such as how they
present themselves to others on metrics of appearance and agreeableness. These help to account
for individual-level factors among respondents that affect their ability to correctly respond to
survey questions – as a function of demographic characteristics, as well as survey-specific
features that increase the likelihood of misreporting. However, these strategies must be employed
at the outset of survey design before it is fielded – leaving room for other strategies that can be
implemented in the analysis stage after data has been collected.

4.2

Multiple Imputation
Multiple imputation works by generating a predicted value as a function of existing data

and multiple imputation models. Multiple predicted values are generated, then pooled to produce
a final best estimate of a given value (Grund, Lüdtke, and Robitzsch 2018). Bias in missing data
is largely a function of its underlying mechanisms (Jakobsen et al. 2017). Thus, systematic
evaluation of responses and the underpinning predictors of such responses allows for a better
specified imputation approach. In the case of suspected bias among ACA beneficiaries,
preliminary evidence that suggests Republican respondents are less reliable in their benefit
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reporting allows for the use of Democrat beneficiary characteristics as a useful guide in
predicting Republican beneficiaries who have not otherwise self-reported.
Applying multiple imputation approaches in generating values for systematic
missingness, results from studies within the political science discipline during the preceding fiveyear time period disappear at a rate of nearly 50% (Lall 2017). This provides promising evidence
in support of applying multiple imputation in evaluating the effect of systematic misreporting of
beneficiary status. Though multiple imputation is traditionally leveraged to account for missing
data, the potential negative effects of social desirability bias on data completeness are such that
this approach could be a viable tool in estimating misreported data that can be compared to
existing benefit self-reports – specifically as a tool in analysis after data collection is complete.

5. Theory
Social identity characteristics that underpin political identity along with partisanship and
political knowledge interact to moderate social desirability bias and motivated reasoning. These
biases manifest in the willful misinterpretation of survey questions and/or subsequent
misreporting of policy benefit to project a certain image or maintain internal consistency based
on individual beliefs and intersecting identity characteristics. These strong social identity
characteristics interact to strengthen individuals’ propensity to undertake impression
management efforts.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Ideological extremity increases likelihood of impression
management.
Republicans are more likely to engage in impression management – leading to a greater
likelihood of systematic under-reporting among Republican respondents. This is caused by a
multitude of factors such as political socialization and strengthened partisanship. Mapping self-
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reported benefit onto national demographic indicators of ACA benefit, Republicans will report
benefit less than Democratic counterparts with the same demographic indicators.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Strong Republican partisanship increases impression management.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Strong Democratic partisanship has no effect on impression
management.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Impression management decreases likelihood of self-reporting
benefit from the ACA.
When these systematic factors are used to estimate likely ACA benefit via backward
mapping of social identity and demographic characteristics, estimates of benefit will differ from
self-reported benefit specifically among those with higher impression management scores. With
a higher propensity for impression management, this will largely affect Republican respondents
rather than Democrats.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Proportion of Republican ACA beneficiaries increases when
demographic indicators of ACA benefit are used to predict beneficiaries.

6. Data and Methods
I leverage the same dataset as used in Dreher (2021), which merges variables from the
American National Election Study’s (ANES) 2018 Pilot Study (n=2,000) with variables from
the Wesleyan Media Project’s (WMP) 2018 Dataset (n=>1M). The key WMP variable is a
generated variable that averages the volume of campaign media about the 2017 ACA repeal
attempt, by state. Once merged with the ANES data, this variable is used to generate a media
index, which combines average ACA media by state and individual-level political engagement. I
similarly leverage the existing ACA benefit self-report variable used in Dreher (2021).
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For political extremity, I center my analysis on variables measuring both partisan strength
and ideology. To proxy likelihood of social desirability bias via impression management, I
leverage a variable on self-censoring that asks respondents whether they find the need to manage
how they present their views to others. Finally, standard demographic covariates and known
predictors of ACA benefit are included in the analysis: income, race, gender, and state Medicaid
expansion status – recoded as a binary indicator based on Medicaid expansion implemented prior
to the 2018 Midterm Elections.
I employ a multi-step methodological approach to trace the narrative developed in my
theoretical framework. First, I measure the effect of partisanship and ideology on impression
management – establishing whether a relationship exists between political extremity and
impression management. Using an ordered probit regression, I model the effect of partisanship
and ideology on self-censoring behaviors – which serves as a proxy for social desirability bias.
Covariates for standard demographic predictors of ACA benefit are included. This identifies the
subset of survey respondents most susceptible to social desirability bias when asked to selfreport policy benefit. Second, I examine Republican and Democratic partisans to measure the
degree to which political extremity differs in its impact on impression management behaviors.
This allows me to isolate partisans most susceptible to social desirability bias and misreporting
benefits. Third, I use the self-censoring variable to predict self-reported ACA benefit.
Finally, I predict likely beneficiaries using known beneficiary demographic indicators,
comparing these estimates against self-reported beneficiary status within the original dataset. I
duplicate the existing ACA benefit variable that relies on self-reports, replacing existing
responses from Republican respondents as missing values within that new variable. I then use
this new variable to regress known predictors of ACA benefit on Democratic self-reports to
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produce multiple imputation datasets. I use these datasets to predict the “missing” values – in this
case, beneficiary status for all Republican respondents. I compare these results with the original
self-report variable to evaluate differences in benefit estimates relative to self-reported benefit.
Together, this 3-step approach tests the hypotheses set forth within this study sequentially,
inclusive of standard demographic covariates to evaluate the effect of individual-level
characteristics on each models’ respective dependent variables.

7. Results
7.1

Establishing the Link Between Political Extremity, Impression Management, and
Benefit Reporting
Assessing the predicted likelihood of self-censoring behavior among ideologues, a clear

finding emerges: Conservative ideologues are the only group whose ideology predicts selfcensoring behaviors (see Figure 1). Interestingly, this is not true among those who identify as
‘Very conservative’ – or, the most conservative ideologues. In the frame of H1, this provides
mixed evidence in support of my theory. While ideological belief does matter, belief extremity
seems to matter less than anticipated. However, given that conservatives are more likely to
engage in self-censoring behaviors, it is possible that they are mis-reporting their ideological
extremity as a function of that propensity for impression management.
Comparing these findings to predictions of self-censoring behaviors among partisan
groups (see Figure 2), Republican-leaning independents and strong Republicans are the only
groups whose partisanship predicts self-censoring behaviors, supporting the theory outlined in
H2. Meanwhile, Democrats see no predictive effect of their partisanship on likelihood of selfcensoring, which provides evidence supportive of H3. This indicates that partisanship functions
as a stronger predictor of impression management in the form of self-censoring behaviors than
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does ideological extremity among conservative Republicans. Given what we know of ideological
innocence among American voters, these findings track well with existing literature which
establishes a stronger connection to partisan identity than to ideological identity. Thus, an
argument can be made that the results in Figure 2 provide a clearer picture of the patterns that
exist with self-censorship and political extremity. Nevertheless, further research related to this
phenomenon is necessary to fully articulate the nuances present among extreme ideologues and
their relationship with corresponding partisan identities.

Figure 1. Predicting Self-Censoring Behavior as a Function of Ideology

Self-censoring does, however, lead to a decrease in self-reporting ACA benefit (See
Figure 3). This effect is visualized alongside the effect of living in a state that expanded
Medicaid, where benefit is most widespread and thus more normalized – wielding a positive,
statistically and substantively significant effect on self-reporting behaviors. These findings are
consistent with the hypothesis outlined in H4, that those with a propensity for self-censorship are
less likely to report benefiting from the ACA.
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Figure 2. Predicting Self-Censoring Behavior as a Function of Partisanship

Figure 3. Effect of Self-Censoring on Self-Reporting ACA Benefit

Considering the findings articulated in Figures 1 through 3, support for my broader
theoretical framework begins to take shape. Not only does political extremity predict selfcensoring behaviors, but these self-censoring behaviors produce differences in benefit reporting
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among the very group suspected of under-reporting. Republicans are more likely to censor their
beliefs, and those most likely to self-censor are also least likely to report ACA benefit. While not
all strong Republicans necessarily benefit from the ACA, inclusion of covariates that equally
predict ACA benefit such as gender, income, and race do not lessen that substantive nor
statistical significance of self-censorship on reporting of ACA benefits.

7.2

Predicting “Missing” Self-Reports and Comparing Model Estimates
To predict ACA benefit, I treat Republican responses as “missing” in order to most

effectively leverage a multiple imputation approach with the data. I generate a duplicate benefit
variable; whereby Republican responses are coded as non-responses. In total, this results in 849
newly designated “missing” responses within that duplicate variable – all Republicans in the
sample. I then register this duplicate benefit variable as an imputed variable and register as
regular variables all demographic predictors being considered in this analysis: income,
education, race, gender, and living in a Medicaid expansion state. Regressing these predictors on
the duplicate benefit variable, I generate 34 imputations to predict the “missing” values. The set
number of imputations reflects the missingness of the data following a linear approach, wherein
missing responses in the duplicate benefit variable total 34% of the sample population.
Comparison of summary statistics between the original data, the first imputation, and the final
imputation are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Imputation Summary Statistics

Original (m=0)
First Imputation
(m=1)
Final Imputation
(m=34)

Observations
1,651
2,375

Mean
.337977
.3326316

Standard Deviation
.473164
.471255

2,375

.3427368

.474724
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The similarity in means and standard deviation across the original, initial, and final
imputations indicates that the imputation process was completed as intended and produced
reliable estimations that follow a normal distribution. I use these imputation sets to fit the logistic
regression, which detects significant effects of each education, race, and gender within the
“missing” data. I then compare the percentage of Republican self-reports from Table 1 with a
similar breakdown of percentage of predicted Republican beneficiaries within the data (see Table
3).
Table 3. Comparison of Republican Self-Reports with Imputed Benefit Estimation

Less than college
degree
College degree or
more

Democratic SelfReports
40%

Republican SelfReports
9%

Predicted Republican
Benefit
30%

40%

7%

37%

Men
Women

44%
37%

6%
10%

34%
32%

Non-Hispanic white
Hispanic
Black
Other

39%
39%
44%
46%

7%
17%
38%
5%

32%
38%
35%
41%

Medicaid Expansion
State
Non-Medicaid
Expansion State

44%

9%

37%

32%

6%

26%

Source: Original Imputation Data. Source data compiled from 2018 ANES, 2018 WMP.

The descriptive results in Table 3 highlight how estimated benefit among Republican
respondents tracks much more closely with Democratic self-reports than do Republican selfreports. While 44% of Democrats self-report benefit in Medicaid expansion states, the predicted
benefit among Republicans is 37% - much closer than the self-reported benefit percentage of 9%.
We know that Medicaid expansion states see generally equal gains across Democrats and
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Republicans alike, so the imputed results track onto what we know of beneficiaries and where
they live. This underscores how imputation provides what we can reasonably believe to be a
generally accurate reflection of benefit among a population that is affected by ideological
extremity and self-censorship that make self-reports like those contained in the 2018 ANES Pilot
Study unreliable at best. We also know that among other characteristics, such as education,
gender, and race, Republican beneficiaries are less prevalent compared to Democratic
beneficiaries as a function of income differences. This tracks well given the predicted
Republican beneficiaries outlined by demographic indicator in Table 3. These results
additionally indicate support for H5, whereby Republican self-reports reflect how Republican
partisans do not self-report ACA benefit at the same rate as Democrats who share the same
demographic characteristics. However, when evaluating imputed benefit estimates, more
Republicans are identified as ACA beneficiaries on the basis of their demographic characteristics
than self-report benefit in the original ANES data.

9. Discussion
While results suggest that concerns about self-reported ACA benefit are indeed not
unfounded, and Republican partisans are of particular concern insofar as they are less likely to
report benefits compared to Democrats with the same demographic characteristics, multiple
imputation is not a catch-all solution to solving the problem of social desirability bias. The
imputed results do more closely map onto what we might expect among the national population
in terms of likely ACA benefit, however these estimates rely on the assumption that Democrats
themselves are not over or under-reporting their own benefits from the ACA. This study provides
analysis that suggests this is not a significant concern, nevertheless further study into benefit
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reporting and those factors that compound to produce biased responses should be pursued –
specifically as it relates to the ACA.
Future study should similarly focus on the multitude of social identity characteristics that
interact to increase impression management and subsequent social desirability bias. In particular,
religiosity is of particular interest among Republican partisans, who are more likely to be both
religiously and politically extreme relative to their Democratic counterparts. Moreover, new
solutions to mitigate the effect of social desirability bias should be considered, including how to
more specifically predict likely beneficiaries – and how to compare these predictions to benefit
estimates by state, county, zip code for increased specificity in these predictive methods as a
measure of robustness.
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Policy Messaging and Political Participation: Lessons from the Affordable Care Act (ACA)

Abstract
For the first time since its passage, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) faced a serious threat
of repeal in 2017. This repeal threat was strongly opposed by beneficiaries, yet many still
pointed to the opportunity for a new replacement policy as a worthy alternative. How do threat
and opportunity differently affect political behaviors? Does one matter more than the other?
Threat and opportunity each wield effects on political behaviors, yet the significance of these
effects is uneven and differs across policy types. I use an original survey experiment to evaluate
the effect of threat and opportunity messaging on political participation and attitude formation
around the ACA. Findings add to the current state of the literature, with results indicating mixed
effects linked to threat rather than opportunity as a primary motivator of political behavior to
protect against that threat, even among low-resourced groups.
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1. Repeal Threats and Policy Promises
Despite the fact that not a single Republican legislator voted in support of the Affordable
Care Act (ACA), Republican partisans nationwide are among some of the largest beneficiary
groups of ACA-backed coverage – especially in Medicaid expansion states (Garfield, Orgera,
and Damico 2019b). One of these states is Kentucky, which expanded Medicaid under the ACA
in 2014 and saw more than a 50% decrease in its uninsured rate following its implementation
(Pugel 2020). The 2016 election offered two distinct behavioral pathways: mobilize against the
imminent repeal threat all but guaranteed under a potential Trump administration, or
enthusiastically support the alternative legislation that would replace the ACA post-repeal.
Enthusiasm for new legislation quickly died when it became clear that the ACA was under threat
with no real path forward to replace it. Many Trump supporters did not believe that he could
actually repeal the law that they benefited from (Kliff 2016), sharing just months later in 2017
the depth of their disappointment with the repeal attempt and their deep concern over the threat
posed to their insurance benefits (Kliff 2017). Despite this, and with acknowledgement for the
Trump administration’s failed attempt to pass new health care legislation before gutting the
protections afforded by the ACA, Kentuckians did not report any real change to their publicfacing political participation or any vocal dissent against the man they supported in the general
election. A puzzling picture, but one that offers a case study of the various ways we participate in
politics and what motivates that participation: be it reliance on the opportunity of prospective
gains under new policies, or the threat of benefit loss.
When weighing the threat of benefit loss against the opportunity for prospective benefit
gain, which is more motivating in terms of political participation? We know that threat can work
as a mobilizing force (Alesina and Passarelli 2015; Campbell 2005; Dreher 2021; Kahneman and
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Tversky 1979; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Osmundsen and Petersen 2019). However,
not all threats are equal as far as their audiences are concerned (Miller and Krosnick 2004;
Phoenix 2019). Indeed, opportunity messaging can lead to behavioral changes in instances where
threat produces none – though evidence to this effect is similarly mixed (Miller and Krosnick
2004; Nichols 2017; Phoenix 2019). Beyond the type of messaging used to describe policy
change, behaviors do not change if voters do not have sufficient information to inform their
actions. Kentuckians believed that Trump would not threaten the ACA, and instead pointed to his
proposed alternative as proof of something better to come – admitting that they did not fully
understand the implications associated with the threat of repeal.
How does policy change messaging around the ACA affect political behavior? I use an
original survey experiment (n=1,413) fielded via Lucid in April 2022 to evaluate the effect of
threat and opportunity messaging on political participation and attitude formation, adapting
treatments from Miller and Krosnick’s (2004) original experimental work. In separating out
policy messages tied to the ACA as competing and not complimentary – for example: repeal vs.
replace as two distinct treatment groups, as opposed to a collective message of repeal and replace
– the relative substantive impact of each threat and opportunity is more specifically measured
against the other in the controlled environment offered by this study’s experimental design.
Findings provide mixed support for the hypotheses laid out in this study, but generally indicate
that – at least in the case of the ACA – threat serves as a greater motivator than opportunity, even
among low-resourced groups who we might expect to be less able to participate as a function of
resource constraints. These results contribute to a burgeoning literature on policy change
messaging and what types of messaging incite behavioral change among varied populations.

2. Policy Change Messaging
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2.1

Threat
Policy change is categorized in the literature along two primary themes. First is in the

frame of policy threat, which focuses on threat as a mechanism that facilitates behavioral change.
Threat is closely related to the loss aversion literatures typical to discussion of prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). Threat, as a function of
cueing individuals to the prospect of individual loss, produces behavioral changes to protect
against that threat to oneself (Alesina and Passarelli 2015; Osmundsen and Petersen 2019).
Evidence from (Dreher 2021a) leverages survey data to highlight how threat does produce
behavioral change among threatened populations – with increased political participation among
those who are most concerned about losing their insurance when faced with ACA repeal.
This finding reinforces evidence from previous studies, which find that policy threat can
work as a mobilizing force (Campbell 2003, 2005; Towler and Parker 2018). Threat is similarly
found to improve evaluations of policies viewed as counterbalancing that threat (Adira and
Halida 2021; Schmuck and Matthes 2017), underscoring the range of behaviors altered by threat
exposure and subsequent protective actions. Such findings add to a conflicted literature, whereby
threat is found to both increase and decrease participation depending on the policy issue being
studied and the behavioral change being measured (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000;
Miller et al. 2016; Miller and Krosnick 2004).

2.1

Opportunity
Policy opportunity messaging provides a second frame through which policy change can

be conceptualized and subsequently leveraged as a mobilizing tool. While the literature on threat
is robust, the literature on policy opportunity is less substantial. Nevertheless, similar to threat,
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enthusiasm for new policy opportunities can facilitate behavioral changes – sometimes in
instances when threat wields no behavioral effect at all. Policy opportunity messaging ties into a
larger dynamic within social impact theory, whereby individuals’ appetite for collective action is
diminished by the perception that they can reap benefits of others without needing to act
themselves (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Miller and
Krosnick 2004; Nichols 2017; Olson 1971). Miller and Krosnick (2004) find that individuals
exposed to materials insinuating policy threat are more likely to financially contribute, but that
exposure to policy opportunity increases non-fiscal participation such as signing post-cards in
support for the policy (Miller and Krosnick 2004). That study highlights how policy threat and
opportunity can work simultaneously, producing varied effects depending on exposure to
different policy change cues.
It is evident that policy opportunity is itself a powerful motivating tool beyond threat,
particularly for different groups of people where the same types of policy appeals, and
messaging strategies, do not uniformly affect people across groups. Within the Black
community, for instance, opportunity messages encourage political participation where threatbased appeals may not (Phoenix 2019). Threat and opportunity frames can also be combined in
policy change messaging to incite behavioral change among other populations, where
opportunity cues serve as a key factor in motivating political participation above and beyond
threat cues alone (Nichols 2017). Anecdotally, when a replacement for the ACA was discussed
as a new and exciting policy opportunity, this same discussion was used to minimize the
imminent threat posed to the ACA itself – leading to wide-ranging discussion of how the ACA
had failed and how its post-repeal replacement would be better (Diamond 2015; Donovan and
Kelsey 2017; Knight 2020). In instances where threat is fully counterbalanced by enthusiasm, we
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might expect attitudes in support of the new policies to become more favorable while attitudes of
the policies under threat to become less favorable. This tracks with prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979), wherein losses and gains measure against one another differently for
different individuals, sparking a wide range of potential behavioral responses.

3.

Resource Inequality and Experimental Manipulations

Individual interests related to policies, however – be they framed as opportunities or as
threats – only incite engagement among motivated individuals. Evidence from Jacobs and
Mettler (2018) highlights how, in the case of the ACA, partisanship is not the most determinative
factor mediating preference formation and policy attitudes. However, that study relies on survey
data and does not trace how attitudinal change compares to participatory changes – and does not
leverage an experimental design, as this study does. Indeed, reporting changes in preferences as a
function of ACA benefit is one thing – taking the time to participate to protect against perceived
threat to those benefits is another. This is because political participation comes at a cost to the
participant. Whether this cost is time or money, the resources necessary to participate in politics
are not equally distributed. While some individual-level factors such as strong partisanship
facilitate political mobilization (Gelman and King 1993; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004;
Huddy 2003; Johnston 1992; Shaw 1999), this mobilizing effect is confounded by ability to
mobilize in the first place.
On the whole, evidence suggests that those who are older, married, and educated
consistently vote more than members of other groups as a function of the resources typically
afforded to them (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Education is a good proxy for political
knowledge and income, which jointly underpin the resources necessary to participate politically
(Putnam 2001). When we consider who benefits from the ACA and the fact that they are more
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likely to lack resources necessary for political participation, they may be less able to mobilize in
support of their benefits in instances of benefit threat. This can produce a self-reinforcing
feedback loop that advantages those with resources to continue engaging lawmakers and
advocating for their benefits, leaving the preferences and needs of low-resourced citizens behind
and reproducing further inequalities in the future (Bartels 2012).
Those who most often mobilize share underlying characteristics that facilitate their
political participation such as time, awareness, and money (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001;
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). These are some of the most prominent costs incurred in order
to participate politically – if an individual lacks access to one of these primary tools, their ability
to participate politically diminishes. Consider the example of Kentucky Republicans who benefit
from the ACA: they did not fully understand the scope of threat to their benefits or the feasibility
of the opportunity being presented to them. Policy messages hinge on their full understanding,
something we know many voters simply do not possess (Converse 2006a).

4. Theory
The state of the literature on policy messaging and its behavioral impacts indicates that
opportunities and threats are important in their own ways, as each facilitates behavioral and
attitudinal change, though these effects range in substantive and statistical significance across
policies with no clear pattern. Since little is known of the impact that threat and opportunity
messaging have on behaviors linked to the ACA specifically, I propose competing hypotheses to
better evaluate which messaging is most effective at increasing political participation:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Exposure to policy opportunity messaging will increase
participation in support of policy opportunities.
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Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Exposure to policy threat messaging will increase participation in
support of policies under threat.
I expect that policy evaluations and voter behavior will be affected similarly to other
metrics of political mobilization examined in this study, presenting a second set of competing
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Exposure to policy opportunity messaging will increase
perceptions of policy approval, perceptions of effectiveness, voter registration, and vote
intention.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Exposure to policy threat messaging will increase perceptions of
policy approval, perceptions of effectiveness, voter registration, and vote intention.
Considering protective behaviors in instances of threat, I expect that voters cued to the
threat treatment will back candidates in upcoming elections that they view as supporters of the
ACA: Democratic policymakers. Thus, exposure to policy threat will increase vote intention for
Democratic candidates:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Exposure to policy threat messaging will increase preference for
Democratic candidates.
Resource disparities among the electorate will impact respondent’s participation even
within the scope of the survey experiment. To this end, those who are less able to participate as a
function of their income, race, and gender identity will be less likely to express likelihood of
participation – specifically when exposed to threat messaging. Threat can wield a demobilizing
effect on already under-represented and under-resourced groups. Meanwhile, opportunity
messaging is likely to appeal more strongly to these same groups as compared to the effect of
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threat. These contrasting effects will be observable both in terms of participation, policy
attitudes, and voter behaviors:
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): Exposure to policy threat messaging among low-resourced voters
will decrease participation in support of policies under threat.
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): Exposure to policy threat messaging among low-resourced voters
will decrease policy approval, perceptions of effectiveness, and intention to vote.
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): Exposure to policy opportunity messaging among low-resourced
voters will increase participation in support of policy opportunities.
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): Exposure to policy opportunity messaging among low-resourced
voters will increase policy approval, perceptions of effectiveness, and intention to vote.

5. Methods
I test this theory using a survey experiment4 to incite threat and opportunity amongst
different subsets of respondents to compare the effects of exposure to different types of ACA
policy change on the same participatory metrics. Pre-exposure questions capture demographic
characteristics, insurance status and source, partisanship, and attention paid to politics. Two
attention checks are included to ensure active participation and more accurate measurement of
treatment effects. The survey is built in Qualtrics and fielded via Lucid to ~1,400 respondents.
I adapt treatments used in (Miller and Krosnick 2004), who use threat versus opportunity
to compare the effects of prospective loss and prospective gains on political participation.
Treatments focus on threat and impact of loss and opportunity for potential gains and benefit.
The threat treatment describes a potential threat to the ACA which focuses on increasing
participants’ sense of threat surrounding insurance and the wide-ranging impacts of insurance

4

See Appendix A for treatments. IRB approval: Understanding Political Behavior (IRB#22-048).
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loss. The opportunity treatment describes the potential for expansion of ACA protections,
increasing participants’ sense of hope and opportunity at the potential positive impacts that
extend from insurance improvement to other aspects of their lives. These treatments were chosen
because they most closely reflect the political climate surrounding the ‘Repeal and Replace’
mantra that dominated discussion of health policy in the early Trump administration. As such,
discussion of threat to ACA benefits closely mirrors the content of coverage at the time related to
ACA repeal. Meanwhile, discussion of benefit expansion mirrors content of coverage related to
the benefits of replacing the ACA with a policy that is better for the American people. The
neutral control describes the ACA undergoing routine policy maintenance to maintain the policy
in its current form – indicating no threat or opportunity but outlining how such action is a normal
part of policymaking.
Given that this study utilizes a survey experiment rather than a field experiment, posttreatment questions measure likelihood of engaging in different political activities in light of the
article the participant is asked to read. Following in the tradition of Miller and Krosnick (2004)
who find differential effects on type and extent of participation as a function of exposure to
threat-focused versus opportunity-focused messaging, I include 3 options for potential
participation: (1) requesting more information; (2) signing a petition (either for or against); and
(3) making a donation (to pro-ACA or anti-ACA organization), followed by a question asked
only of those who planned to donate what the value of their donation would be. This aligns with
options provided to field experiment participants in that 2004 study.
Additional post-test questions include measures of issue importance, vote intention, and
likely vote choice – allowing for a direct test of findings in Dreher (2021a). Moreover, policy
attitudes are captured regarding approval of the ACA, perceived effectiveness of the ACA, and
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personal benefit from the ACA. These post-test measures closely align to those used by (Jacobs
and Mettler 2018), whose findings suggest that, at least in the case of the ACA, there is more to
attitude formation and policy preferences than partisanship.
To analyze these data, I compare means across treatment groups to measure different
levels of participation when participants are exposed to the opportunity article versus the threatbased article. Given this approach, I do not include covariates in my analysis and base findings
on comparisons of means across treatment groups as compared to the control group. I break my
analysis down by demographic indicators commonly associated with low-resourced voters,
including income, race, and gender identity. In order to accurately evaluate differences between
means of specific groups and their treatment effects, I generate dummy variables for women and
non-white respondents. I similarly generate a dummy variable for low-income by measuring the
median income among respondents and indicating those who fell below the median. This
additional analysis allows me to measure differences that exist between groups insofar as their
responses to the experimental treatments are likely to differ from respondents who do not deal
with the same lack of political resources.

6. Results
Equal distribution across treatment and control groups of the total sample after
respondents who did not consent to participation are dropped (n=1,379) leads to assignment of
430 participants to the control group, 464 participants to the threat treatment, and 485
participants to the opportunity treatment. Gender distribution, educational attainment, and
political interest are similarly equal across treatment and control groups. This indicates
successful randomization via Lucid, increasing reliability of treatment effect estimates.
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6.1

Evaluating Efficacy of Threat versus Opportunity Messaging

Figure 1. Participatory Behaviors by Treatment Group

Comparing means across treatment groups (see Figure 1), threat prevails as more
determinative in predicting protective behaviors than opportunity does in spurring supportive
ones. As expected, participants in the threat treatment are more likely to donate in opposition and
sign a petition in opposition to amendments that would roll back ACA protections. The
difference in mean effect of the threat treatment relative to the control group is 0.13 (p<0.000)
for donations in opposition and 0.22 (p<0.000), respectively. This is in contrast to the
opportunity treatment group; whose respondents are no more likely to donate in support or sign a
petition in support of prospective gains under a new amendment to the ACA meant to expand the
policy. In the frame of the competing hypotheses outlined in H1, these findings indicate support
for H1b, that exposure to policy threat messaging increases participation in support of policies
under threat – in this case, support is shown by donating to opposition groups rather than groups
supportive of threatening amendments to the ACA. These results jointly indicate that policy
opportunity, at least in the frame of the ACA, does not increase participation in a similar manner.
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Neither the threat nor opportunity treatments has any effect on requests for information about the
hypothetical amendments discussed in the experiment.
While participatory behaviors are affected by treatment type, perceptions of coverage
improvements for pre-existing conditions, affordability of the participants’ own insurance, and
ACA approval are unaffected across treatment groups (see Figure 2). This returns null results
related to H2a and H2b, indicating that neither threat nor opportunity have any effect on ACA
policy approval and perceptions of effectiveness.

Figure 2. Policy Approval and Evaluations of the ACA by Treatment Group

In terms of voter behavior, the only treatment effects observed are on issue importance
(see Figure 3). While threat increases importance of the ACA to respondent vote choice, with a
difference in the mean effect of the threat treatment relative to the control of 0.26 (p<0.02), both
threat and opportunity messaging fail to increase vote preference for Democratic candidates.
Together, this provides partial confirmation of H3 in terms of voter behavior being somewhat
affected by treatment – however, these results are mixed and require further study. In particular,
the lack of relationship across both treatment groups on Democratic vote choice is interesting
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given the party’s work to preserve and expand the ACA. One possible explanation is that the
ACA has become increasingly de-politicized, so connections that would explain the Democrat’s
protection of the ACA when the policy was first enacted are no longer relevant in the post-repeal
policy environment. Nevertheless, threat remains a prevailing force in terms of its positive
relationship with the behaviors evaluated in this study – at least among those where a statistically
significant relationship is observable.

Figure 3. Voter Behavior by Treatment Group

6.2

Impact of Resource Disparity on Political Behaviors
I theorize that low-resourced voters will respond differently to opportunity versus threat

messaging, however results suggest the opposite. Rather than opportunity messaging wielding a
positive effect on participation, it is actually threat that has a positive – though mixed across
behaviors – effect on participation (see Figure 4). Women and nonbinary citizens donate in
opposition to threatening amendments – that is, spending money to protect against the threat. The
difference in mean effect of the threat treatment relative to the control group is 0.13 (p<0.000)
among these citizens. They are the only low-resourced group for whom there is an observable,
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statistically significant relationship between policy messaging and financial contributions. The
only statistically significant effects observed across all low-resourced groups is the effect of
threat messaging on signing a petition in opposition to policy threat. The difference in mean
effect of the threat treatment relative to the control group in terms of signing a petition in
opposition to ACA threat is 0.2 (p<0.000) for low-income respondents, 0.2 (p<0.01) for minority
respondents, and 0.22 (p<0.000) for women and non-binary respondents, respectively.
This is perhaps the lowest stakes participatory behavior in terms of the limited resources
required to sign, and such findings are unsurprising given that fact. Taken together, however, this
evidence suggests that – at least in the case of the ACA – policy opportunity messaging is not a
catch-all solution to activate low-resourced groups, who do respond to threat in some
circumstances despite evidence in the existing literature of its potentially demobilizing effects.

Figure 4. Participatory Behaviors by Treatment in Low-Resourced Groups
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Similar to participation, opportunity does not positively affect likelihood of voting in the
next election, the ACA being noted as a key issue determining voter behavior, or likelihood of
voting for a Democratic candidate. Threat does, however, increase perceptions of ACA issue
importance as a voting issue among non-white citizens and women, alike. The difference in
mean effect of the threat treatment relative to the control group in terms of perceptions of ACA
issue importance is 0.65 (p<0.003) for minority respondents and 0.3 (p<0.02) for women and
non-binary respondents, respectively. However, both threat and opportunity treatments decrease
women’s intention of voting for Democratic candidates – indicative that women are much more
diverse in terms of political views and policy attitudes than other low-resourced groups who rely
on the big tent coalition of the Democratic party as a sole source of social benefits. The
difference in mean effect of the threat treatment relative to the control group in terms of the
likelihood that women and non-binary respondents vote for Democratic candidates is -0.12
(p<0.02). Taken together, these results again indicate mixed support for H4 and H5.

10. Discussion
While threat and opportunity have long been studied as significant predictors of political
behavior, the results of this study indicate that – at least in the case of the ACA – threat is a more
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effective motivator than opportunity in terms of political behavior. In particular, threat similarly
motivates lower resourced citizens – specifically in terms of informal participation outside of the
legislative process. Likely voting is not affected by threat nor opportunity, but threat increases
participation outside of the electoral system.
A noted limitation of this study’s experimental design is the opportunity treatment. In the
early Trump administration, the ACA was discussed as being repealed and replaced rather than
improved and expanded on. In this vein, it is possible that the believability of this treatment is
diminished relative to the threat treatment given the post-repeal environment that this experiment
is fielded in. Nevertheless, using the ACA as a fixture in both treatments allows for closer
comparison of ACA-replaced threat and opportunity, rather than comparing more general health
policy threats and opportunity.
These findings have several implications for our understanding of policy threat and
political behavior. Most notably, educating about policy threat and subsequently offering
individuals the opportunity to act in response to threat leads to increased participation even
among lower resourced groups. Threat directs people to behaviors that they perceive as most
effective for policy outcomes, evident in the increased participation to protect the ACA under
conditions of threat. Non-electoral strategies to effect policy change are more favorable than
those focused on voting, which is a blunter measure relative to nuanced behaviors such as
petition signing and financial contributions to policy and political organizations/candidates. In
the frame of interest groups, threat may be considered a tool to active public involvement in
interest-driven policy work – a topic that requires further study in future research.
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Key Findings, Future Research, and Implications for Policymakers
This project’s findings have wide-ranging implications for the existing literatures on
political behavior and policy feedback effects, alike, in that they isolate how policy threat can
produce feedbacks in the form of behavioral change among the electorate to act in ways that
protect their benefits. Despite existing evidence that threat can depress political behavior among
low-resourced groups, this study underscores conditions in which the opposite effect can be
observed: specifically in instances where individuals are (1) made aware of the threat, and (2)
given the opportunity to engage in protective behaviors.
The results of this project collectively support the narrative that threat produces
behavioral policy feedbacks in terms of non-electoral political participation, contributing to a
burgeoning literature on behavioral feedbacks and their usefulness to policymakers in
consideration of mobilization and policy messaging strategies. This project similarly evaluates
limits to the generalizability of its own findings, specifically in considering the effect of threat on
self-reported beneficiaries and their behaviors. As is demonstrated in paper 2, misreporting of
policy benefits as a function of partisan social desirability bias is an important concern when
drawing conclusions from results that specifically measure the effect of threat on political
behavior among self-reported beneficiaries.
This is notable in comparing the findings of paper 1, which relies on survey self-reports,
versus paper 3, which leverages an experimental manipulation to induce threat. In paper 1,
benefit threat is shown to have a positive effect on political participation among self-identifying
beneficiaries – specifically among those whose self-interest is at odds with their own party (ie.
Republican partisans who benefit from the ACA). Moreover, electoral behaviors like voter
registration and turnout are similar among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, though ACA
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benefit leads to increased support for Democratic candidates across all voters – including
Republicans. In paper 3, I find that exposure to threat messaging also increases non-electoral
behaviors to protect against prospective threat. Voting differences, however, are not evident as
they are in paper 1 – specifically in threat having no effect on preference for Democratic
candidates.
Why do these differences exist, specifically in terms of electoral behaviors? First, these
differences could be the result of focusing on individual benefit and self-perceptions of threat in
paper 1 versus inducing threat in the treatment group within the experiment leveraged in paper 3,
without specifying individual benefit status. Indeed, the experiment isolates the effect of threat
on political behavior, whereas the first paper evaluates the interaction between self-reported
benefit and threat perception on behaviors. Alternatively, discussion in paper 2 highlights issues
with self-reports and offers another perspective on why results tied to electoral outcomes differ
across studies: self-reports are not always reliable. Paper 1 relies on behavioral change among
self-described ACA beneficiaries in particular, however Republicans are found in paper 2 to be
less likely to report ACA benefit. In this frame, the results in paper 1 may simply be built on
unreliable data and subsequent estimates of voter behavior. Evidence from paper 3, however,
confirms the reliability of findings pertaining to non-electoral behaviors; indicating that further
research is necessary to tease out the inconsistencies in voter behavior evident across these two
studies.
Given that it is difficult to find accurate, individual-level data on ACA beneficiaries that
is not built around self-reports from surveys like the ANES and others, it makes sense given the
findings of this project to focus efforts on expanding experimental research to consider the ways
in which threat affects all individuals regardless of their personal benefit status. Moreover,
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scholars and policymakers, alike, would benefit from investing time and resources into building
national datasets similar to existing voter databases that identify policy beneficiaries and allow
for matching to political behavior datasets so that future research can better trace the impacts of
threat among these populations specifically. This has the dual effect of improving reliability of
results in studies that examine the impact of threat on political behavior and the scope of those
behavioral policy feedbacks, while also tracing the implications of these behaviors for future
policy change with consideration for how individuals can gain and lose benefits over time.
Since the ACA has now faced and overcome the threat of repeal head-on, with wideranging behavioral impacts among voters of all partisan leanings as is demonstrated by this
project, it is reasonable to expect that the policy is unlikely to face another similar challenge as it
did in 2017. Future research stemming from this project should therefore evaluate its findings
along the backdrop of other policy issues. Though I argue that the ACA is a unique policy issue
for a myriad of reasons, examining which strategies work to mobilize individuals in the face of
threats against other policies will further enhance the literature on behavioral policy feedbacks –
which largely focuses on attitudinal change rather than protective mobilization.
Aside from the implications of this project from a scholarly perspective, there are
actionable takeaways relevant to policymakers and campaign professionals, alike. Namely, that
this is largely a non-electoral story. Non-electoral mobilization is a much more attainable goal
than electoral mobilization in the face of policy threat. Whether or not this is portable to other
policy areas warrants additional study in future scholarship, however making people aware of
threat – and offering them an opportunity to act on that threat – is an incredibly effective
mobilizing tool that works across all groups, regardless of resource disparities that have typically
limited the political ability of low-income and non-white citizens. If policymakers aim to protect
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other policies against threat of repeal, they cannot reliably focus on turning out more voters and
should instead shift their focus to non-electoral strategies that can shift the policy narrative in
their favor. This is of particular benefit because, unlike the blunt force of voting and elections,
non-electoral participation is a constant tool that can be employed at any time. Considering that
the threat of ACA repeal took place in the first year of the Trump administration, more than a
year out from the 2018 elections, non-electoral strategies were the only option available to
actively combat the threat of repeal at the time. Despite continuing advocacy for getting out the
vote – and the merits of increasing voter registration and turnout – this project ultimately
underscores the importance of leveraging other, non-electoral participatory behaviors under
conditions of policy threat to mobilize and protect against it.
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Appendix

A. Experimental Treatments and Post-Treatment Questions
Figure 1. Neutral Control

Figure 2. Threat Treatment

Figure 3. Opportunity Treatment
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Post-Treatment Measures
Given the news article you just read about the ACA, would you request more information about
the proposed amendment to the ACA?
Response options:
• Yes
• No
• Maybe
Given the news article you just read about the ACA, would you sign a petition about the
proposed amendment to the ACA?
Response options:
• Yes, in support of the amendment
• Yes, in opposition to the amendment
• I would not sign a petition either way
Given the news article you just read about the ACA, would you donate to an organization
regarding the proposed amendment to the ACA?
Response options:
• Yes, in support of the amendment
• Yes, in opposition to the amendment
• I would not donate either way
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You indicated that you would make a financial contribution in light of news on the proposed
ACA amendment. How much would you donate?
Do you intend to vote in the 2022 midterm elections?
Response options:
• Yes
• No
• Maybe
You indicated that you are likely to vote in the 2022 midterm elections. What party do you plan
to support in that election?
Response options:
• Democratic
• Republican
• Independent
How important is the proposed ACA amendment to your vote choice in the 2022 midterm
election?
Response options:
• Extremely important
• Very important
• Moderately important
• Slightly important
• Not at all important
How much do you approve or disapprove of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)?
Response options:
• Strongly approve
• Generally approve
• Neither approve nor disapprove
• Generally disapprove
• Strongly disapprove
How effective do you believe the ACA has been at improving coverage for pre-existing
conditions?
Response options:
• Extremely effective
• Very effective
• Moderately effective
• Slightly effective
• Not at all effective
How effective has the ACA been at helping your own family afford health insurance?
Response options:
• Extremely effective
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•
•
•
•

Very effective
Moderately effective
Slightly effective
Not at all effective
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